Did Ukraine’s New F-16s Shoot Down a Russian Su-35 ‘Super Flanker’ Near Kursk?

Following the publication of footage confirming that a Russian Aerospace Forces Su-35 fighter was shot down in the first week of June, which the Ukrainian Air Force reported was “a result of a successful operation in the Kursk direction,” a number of Western and Ukrainian sources have claimed that the aircraft was shot down by an F-16 fighter. These claims followed the delivery of the first F-16s to the Ukrainian Air Force in August 2024, and the loss of one of the fighters within a month of delivery, a second on April 12, and a third on May 16 during an engagement with Russian targets thought to be drones or cruise missiles. The Russian Aerospace Forces are estimated to have lost eight Su-35s to accidents, friendly fire and surface-to-air missile attacks since the outbreak of full scale hostilities in February 2022.

Although the Su-35 has been used intensively for air-to-air operations, and claimed multiple kills against Ukrainian MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters often at high rates in high intensity periods of engagements, the aircraft has never suffered losses in air-to-air combat. The Ukrainian fighter fleet had previously gained no confirmed kills against Russian fighter aircraft, with the discrepancy in capabilities between the aircraft fielded by the two fleets leading Ukraine to primarily employ its fighters to fire long range cruise missiles from deep inside the airspace under its control.

With the F-16 having seen a production run of close to half a century long, there are very significant discrepancies between the capabilities of the variants in service around the world today. The variants operated by the Ukrainian Air Force, however, lie at the opposite end of the spectrum to the modern F-16 Block 70/72 in production today, and are very early 1980s models that have been modernised conservatively. The fighters no only rely on obsolete mechanically scanned array radars, but also lack the Link 16 data link system which leaves their ability to operate as part of a network with other assets highly limited. These ageing F-16s were already widely assessed to be greatly outmatched by the Soviet Union’s top air superiority fighter of the time, the Su-27, with the discrepancy in capabilities between them and modern Su-35s today being significantly greater still.

Ukrainian sources and international analysts have consistently pointed to the severe performance disadvantages faced by the country’s fighters against the more capable models such as the Su-35 fielded by the Russian Aerospace Forces. On June 3 Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuri Ignat stated to this effect: “Unfortunately, today Russia has jets that see farther and missiles that fly farther. That’s even when compared to F-16s. They also have powerful air defences, which work in tandem with aviation.” Ignat previously lamented in March: “The modifications that Ukraine has cannot compete one-on-one in an air battle. We need a comprehensive approach as the [Russian] Su-35 is a relatively new jet… This includes ground-based air defence, electronic warfare systems, and ideally, an airborne radar. Also crucial are onboard radars for our aircraft and air-to-air missiles.”

Russia’s dense deployments of ground based air defence systems and control of the air near the frontlines has been a primary factor leading the Ukrainian Air Force to deploy its fighters far behind the frontlines, where they serve as launch platforms for long range missile attacks. Even when deployed in such a way, however, F-16s have still suffered losses to long range missile attacks. The fact that a Su-35 was shot down in Kursk thus raises the question of the likelihood of an F-16 being deployed so far forward not engage a target well behind the current frontlines. While such operations may be highly viable for squadrons equipped with stealth fighters like the F-35, it remains highly questionable whether F-16s would be employed to engage a target so far inside Russian controlled territory due to the tremendous risks this would entail. Such usage of the fighters would contrast sharply with the particularly risk averse ways the aircraft have been employed so far.

A leading limitation of the F-16s in Ukrainian service that brings their ability to threaten the Su-35 into question is the obsolescence of their radars. These not only serious limit situational awareness, but also leave the fighters highly vulnerable to jamming, while their large radar signatures can easily alert Russian forces to their locations. A number of Western sources have contested that the Ukrainian Air Force may have gotten around this issue by using offboard radars to guide AIM-120 air-to-air missiles to their targets, which would allow F-16s to operate without turning their radars on. The F-16’s lack of a Link 16 data link, however, would limit their ability to use targeting data from assets such as ground-based Patriot missile systems or Saab 340 airborne early warning and control systems. The Saab 340’s relatively small and ageing sensor suite for an aircraft of its type, however, and the aircraft’s very high vulnerability if operating within approximately 400 kilometres of Russian positions, raises serious questions regarding the possibility of the aircraft being used to support the shooting down of a Su-35 near Kursk. The very high levels of training that would be required for such a complex kill also raises questions due to the very limited training time and experience Ukrainian personnel have had.

The possibility of F-16s operating alone shooting down a Su-35 would appear extremely unlikely, arguably far moreso than claims which surfaced in 2019 of Indian Air Force MiG-21s shooting down Pakistan Air Force F-16s, with the discrepancy in capabilities between the fighters in this case being even greater still. Nevertheless, the possibility of near obsolete fighters compensating for the obsolescence of their sensors by pairing relatively modern missiles with AEW&C systems has been highlighted by analysts in the past, and even without Link 16 cannot be discounted entirely. The fact that Western contractors have been confirmed repeatedly to have played central roles in operating complex equipment for Ukraine, and the significant possibility of such personnel being onboard the country’s AEW&C systems, may also have heavily compensated for Ukrainian personnel’s limited training and experience.

Should Ukrainian F-16s have achieved a kill by pairing with AEW&C systems, it would further highlight the considerable value of even lower end AEW&Cs like the Saab 340, and would likely make the two aircraft that Ukraine does field priority targets for future Russian strikes. Sources on both sides have since early 2022 consistently presented kills in ways that would reflect as favourably as possible on their forces to raise morale and the prestige of their defence sectors, and made highly dubious claims to this end. A notable example ws Russian sources’ claims in late 2022 that a very long range kill against a Ukrainian Su-27 fighter, which was though two have been achieved by an air defence system, was in fact achieved by its new Su-57 fighter. The particularly high prestige brought by air-to-air kills in particular has led to such achievements being fabricated entirely, with the most prominent example being wholly unrealistic Ukrainian government claims regarding the ‘Ghost of Kiev’ fighter pilot shooting down multiple far more modern and capable Russian combat jets in the conflict’s opening stages, which was subsequently admitted to have been war propaganda. Similarly, presenting the shootdown of a Su-35 as the result of an F-16 operation would be highly valuable for Ukraine and its Western supporters’ public relations efforts, particularly in light of the growing criticism of the obsolescence and severe limitations of the F-16s Ukraine fields. While the possibility of a kill cannot be discounted, the incentives to misattribute such a kill to an F-16 for public relations purposes remain very significant, while the precedents for doing so are considerable.