China’s New Tank Incorporates Lessons From Ukraine War to Redefine Armoured Warfare Priorities

The emergence of growing quantities of footage showing a new class of main battle tank developed for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Ground Force has provided significant indications of a radical shit in design priorities, which appear to be heavily influenced by the lessons from the intensive armoured engagements that have occurred in the Russian-Ukrainain War. One of the most significant changes is abandonment of the standard 125mm smoothbore gun to rely on a much smaller 105mm gun, which suggests a shift away from a focus on tank-on-tank engagements. The integration of a smaller gun allowed the new tank to be designed with a significantly reduced weight, and likely with a greater capacity for ammunition carriage, at the expense of a reduced penetrative capability against advanced enemy armour. This appears to be a response to the new reality that tank-on-tank engagements are expected to be few and far between, much as they have been in the Ukrainian theatre.

Modern armies are expected to rely increasingly heavily on both drones and guided anti-tank missiles to engage enemy armour, with even the Russian Army, despite its lack of anti-tank missiles with advanced fire and forget and top attack capabilities, still rarely engaging Ukrainian tanks directly with its own armour. Tanks have instead primarily been relied on for infantry support and to counter enemy infantry. China’s emergence as a world leader both in its drone warfare capabilities, and in the capabilities of its anti-tank missiles such as the HJ-10, is expected to further reduce the need for its new main battle tank to frequently engage enemy armour with its main gun. There also remains a significant possibility that advances in the sophistication of Chinese armour piercing rounds has fuelled confidence that adequate penetration can be achieved even with a 105mm gun. A smaller tank design with a lighter gun is expected to allow for particularly high levels of mobility, while also making the vehicles highly compact to transport both by air and by sea. It is likely that two of the tanks can be accommodated within a Y-20 strategic airlifted, compared to just one Type 99 or Type 96 tank.

The new Chinese main battle tank integrates dense array of cameras on its hull, the multiple antennas for active electronically scanned array radar systems on its turret, indicating that its design prioritises a high degree of situational awareness. This is considered vital for the vehicle to be able to optimally serve as a forward deployed force multiplier for drones, artillery and other kinds of supporting assets. These sensors are also expected to provide early warning against attacks by drones and anti-tank guided missiles, and to cue the tank’s active protection systems to automatically engage them. Much like the preceding Russian T-14 tank, which was unveiled in 2015 but has suffered from particularly extreme delays in development, the new Chinese vehicle houses its crew side by side within the hull, indicating that high degrees of automation have been achieved. This arrangement is expected to reduce pressure on the commander, allowing him or her to serve as a drone controller or in other new roles.

The new Chinese main battle tank overall appears to be the most modern and revolutionary design ever to reach a prototype stage since the turn of the century, and highlights the Chinese defence sector’s ability to adapt to new realities particularly quickly. Traditional main battle tanks based on Cold War era designs have demonstrated significant vulnerability in the Ukrainian theatre, with 87 percent of M1A1 Abrams tanks supplied to Ukraine by the United States being lost within 16 months of their participation in hostilities, while the majority of Leopard 2 tanks supplied from across Europe were taken out even more quickly. The T-72B3 which formed the backbone of the Russian Army’s tank units similarly proved to be highly vulnerable during the initial months of hostilities, in particular to attacks by handheld anti-tank missile systems such as the American supplied Javelin. Despite these severe losses, the adaptations made by Russia, Ukraine and countries across the Western world to mitigate vulnerabilities have nevertheless remained far less radical than the changes pioneered by China’s new vehicle, raising the possibility that it could be several years before other countries are able to similarly adapt.