Preparing For the Next Iran War: Why Israel Urgently Needs to Buy America’s AEGIS Ashore Anti-Missile System

Following the conclusion of Iranian-Israeli hostilities in a ceasefire on June 24, eleven days after Israel initiated hostilities by launching large scale strikes on Iranian targets, significant questions have been raised regarding how both Middle Eastern states will strengthen their defences in preparation for the possibility of future periods of open conflict. The Israel Defence Forces have been preparing for contingencies for the possibility of full scale hostilities with Iran for decades, with investments in heavily customised F-35 fifth generation fighters, large arsenals of indigenous air-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, and more recently the procurement of F-15EX heavyweight fighters optimal for long range operations, all having been shaped by the expected challenges of combating the Iranian Armed Forces. A leading challenge of engaging in open hostilities with Iran has remained the ballistic missile strike capabilities of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which while long expected to be able to delivery devastating force against targets across Israel, proved fully capable of meeting expectations despite being used for only limited strikes during recent engagements.

Less than a week after the outbreak of hostilities, Western sources including U.S. officials were quick to draw attention to the growing shortages of surface-to-air missiles used by Israeli air defence systems, specifically the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system, but also the David’s Sling and the Barak 8 systems. These concerns worsened as Iran in the final stages of the conflict began to launch multi-warhead ballistic missiles, which pose significant new challenges and require several times as many interceptors to neutralise. Israel’s shortages of interceptors has been exacerbated by the country’s reliance on indigenous air defence systems, which remain unique to the country and thus cannot be replenished by strategic partners abroad during times of high tensions. This contrasts to American anti-missile systems such as the Patriot, THAAD, and AEGIS, which operators of can see missile stocks rapidly replenished at the expense of the U.S. Armed Forces or of other clients. Thus although the U.S. Army’s THAAD systems and Navy’s AEGIS destroyers deployed to contribute to Israeli missile defences, and the Patriot systems used to defend against Iranian strikes on Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar, can all have their arsenals replenished from global supplies of surface-to-air missiles, and from much larger production lines, replenishing Israeli missile stocks remains far more challenging.

Israel’s difficulties in stockpiling anti-ballistic missiles and in replenishing depleted arsenals may be exacerbated by future strikes on facilities contributing to the production of these missiles, or by attacks on the launchers themselves as was the case in multiple reported successful operations by the Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah in 2024. In light of the extent of Iran’s dependance on ballistic missiles for its defence, Isreal’s approach of relying almost solely on indigenous systems has increasingly been brought to question, with strong arguments having emerged that procurement of systems using common interceptor missiles with the U.S. Armed Forces would be highly advantageous. Although the Patriot system has repeatedly demonstrated serious shortcomings in the past, while the THAAD system has limitations in its versatility and is fielded in only very limited numbers by the U.S. Army, the AEGIS Ashore system presents a potentially much more attractive alternative. While Israel’s intention to present itself as a leader in missile defence technologies, in order to export its indigenous systems to a growing range of clients, may make foreign procurements unfavourable, the benefits for the country’s security situation of procuring the American system are potentially tremendous.

The AEGIS system is currently integrated across more than 110 destroyers and cruisers worldwide, including 74 U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, two Zumwalt Class destroyers, and 9 Ticonderoga Class cruisers, as well as several destroyers Japanese and South Korean destroyers which equip the systems for ballistic missile defence. This compares to just seven THAAD systems in the U.S. Army and one in service abroad. The AEGIS system integrates the SM-3 and the new SM-6 anti-ballistic missiles, which are considered among the most capable in the world, and have both had much more impressive results during testing than the Patriot and THAAD systems. Aland-based variant of the system, the AEGIS Ashore, was developed with the deckhouse, AN/SPY-1 radar, and Mark 41 Vertical Launching System found on Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, allowing countries without destroyer fleets to field the SM-3 and SM-6 for missile defence. Although lacking the mobility of destroyers, the land-based system may be optimal for Israel due to the small size of its territory, and its lack of a maritime power projection capability. By procuring the AEGIS Ashore, Israel would be able to quickly replenish its anti-ballistic missile arsenals from the United States, and potentially also from Northeast Asia, providing a much more robust missile supply to hedge against exclusive reliance on domestically developed systems.

A secondary albeit still significant benefit of procuring the AEGIS Ashore is that the Israel’s missile defences will be able to more quickly benefit from new technologies developed in the United States to counter new kinds of missile threats, with hypersonic glide vehicles being a notable example. The threat posed by these was highlighted when the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps’ first class of hypersonic ballistic missile, the Fattah, was used to engage Israeli targets for the first time in the early hours of June 18. Although Iran is estimated to have only formed a small fraction of its arsenal of Fattah missiles, and to have limited their use in line with the constrained scale of hostilities, the number of these missiles is expected to continue to grow, with a high possibility remaining that hypersonic glide vehicles will be integrated onto more ballistic missile classes in future. This could include missiles capable of carrying multiple glide vehicles, like the new Russian Oreshnik.

Although Israeli and American missile defence systems, including the AEGIS Ashore, are unlikely to introduce a new anti-missile interceptor capable of posing a serious challenge to hypersonic missile attacks in the near future, should such a missile class ever be developed, it is likely based on the far greater scale of R&D being pursued in the U.S. that it will first be available for American systems. Procuring the AEGIS Ashore could thus allow the Israel Defence Forces to benefit from new American missile defence technologies more quickly and seamlessly, and without the difficulties of negotiating technology transfer agreements. This may be particularly vital in light of the serious limitations Israel’s existing systems have recently demonstrated against Iranian attacks.