Learning From Ukraine’s Landmark Drone Attack: America’s Golden Dome Air Defence to Provide an Effective Counter

Following the launch of multiple coordinated attacks on major strategic bomber facilities across Russia on June 1 under Operation Spider’s Web, which saw trucks filled with AI-piloted single use drones infiltrated into Russia to launch short range strikes, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General David W. Allvin on June 3 stated that the ambitious Golden Dome homeland defence initiative could counter such strikes if attempted on American soil. “I think the fascinating thing will be, to what extent, in the future… the Golden Dome will integrate not only [systems to counter] the larger ballistic, cruise, hypersonic missiles, but also some of these closer-in, more effective ones,” he stated. He nevertheless made clear the initial phase of Golden Dome program would not provide a defence against such attacks, indicating that it could take until the late 2030s or early 2040s to materialise. “We’ll see how the conversation gets stirred up again based on the strike, but it shows us that seemingly impenetrable locations need to pay more attention to that,” Allvin added. Little is known regarding the Golden Dome program, although it is estimated to cost over $542 billion over the next two decades, and is intended to provide a defence against both ballistic and cruise missile attacks on the American mainland. Other estimates for its cost have reached figures of over $800 billion when taking its highly ambitious scope into consideration.

Further elaborating on lessons the U.S. Air Force would learn from Ukraine’s landmark operation, which achieved unprecedented results against targets as far as 4000 kilometres from its territory, Allvin suggested that the service could consider adding simpler aircraft to its inventory. He nevertheless cautioned against calls for a heavy reliance on inexpensive unmanned aircraft. Stating that many believed the Air Force should invest in “a bunch of cheap, long-range, and kinetically powerful” unmanned aircraft, he stated that this was wholly unrealistic and that no aircraft could bring all three qualities together. Allvin instead stressed the need for a balanced force, which could rely on cheaper aircraft to disorient adversaries before more costly aircraft were deployed to destroy critical targets. A smart mix lets commanders apply “the right weapon for the right target,” and avoid having to “expend all your high-end kit” on every mission, he stated. Preceding the initiation of Operation Spider’s Web, the value attributed to single use drones had increased significantly, with Russia having developed an indigenous capacity to produce such aircraft from almost nothing in early 2022, to become the world’s largest producer in early 2025. This was in large part achieved due to technology transfers and support from Iran, which had long relied very heavily on such aircraft to compensate for its total lack of modern manned combat jets.

The Golden Dome program is expected to integrate satellites, ground-based air defence systems, surveillance planes and interceptor aircraft protecting the American mainland, as well as possibly internationally deployed cruise and ballistic missile assets to pre-emptively attack possible missile launch sites. It is expected that advances in artificial intelligence will facilitate unprecedented improvements to situational awareness by allowing data from satellites and airborne sensors to be processed far more quickly and in orders of magnitude greater quantities. This data could be used not only to provide waring of potential missile launches abroad, but also from within the United States should an attack comparable to that launched by Ukrainian forces be attempted.

While a number of technologies hold significant promise, the viability of the Golden Dome program overall remains in serious question, with statements from officials to the effect that the system will provide a reliable defence against hypersonic glide vehicles having drawn particular scrutiny. Even against relatively basic ballistic missile attacks without the use of decoys or manoeuvring reentry vehicles, the viability of the existing Ground Based Midcourse Defence system is considered limited, with its testing record remaining far from exceptional despite its high $40 billion cost. The system’s surface-to-air missiles, which lack the ability to intercept hypersonic glide vehicles, are estimated to each cost over $70 million, making a viable defence against a large arsenal of advanced intercontinental range ballistic missiles appear very far from viable.